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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent of corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate 
governance attributes (board composition, board size, CEO duality, director 
ownership, block-holder ownership and the existence of audit committee) 
on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. The 
measurement of disclosure is based on published data created from a 
checklist developed by the United Nations, which was gathered from a 
manual review of financial statements and websites of a sample of Egyptian 
companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Although the levels 
of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, however disclosure is high for 
items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). 
The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some 
ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. 
Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to the 
socio-economic factors in Egypt. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian 
firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG 
disclosure. The findings indicate that that – ceteris paribus – the extent of 
CG disclosure: (1) is lower for companies with duality in position and 
higher ownership concentration as measured by block-holder ownership; 
and (2) increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board 
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and firm size. The results of the study support theoretical arguments that 
companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor 
confidence in the reported accounting information. The empirical evidence 
stems from this study enhances the understanding of the corporate 
governance disclosure environment in Egypt, as one of the emerging 
markets in the Middle East. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, disclosure index, content analysis, 
developing markets, Egypt. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
     This paper focuses on one part of the reform process in Egypt - the 
development of the regulatory framework commencing in the late 1990s to 
improve corporate governance practices. Specifically, it is argued, if such 
practices follow international norms they can mitigate the financial problems of 
developing nations that include: weak and illiquid stock markets, economic 
uncertainties, weak investor protection, and frequent government intervention, 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Gugler et al., 2003; Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002; Reed, 
2002; Ahunwan, 2002); poor performance, and high levels of ownership 
concentration (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002; Ahunwan, 
2002); and state ownership of companies, weak legal and judiciary systems, weak 
institutions, and limited human resources capabilities (Mensah, 2002, Young et 
al., 2008).  
     However, de jure reform does not necessarily translate into reform of actual 
practice, and although many researchers have examined corporate governance in 
developed nations, much less academic study has been made of developing and 
emerging nations. This is an important omission for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
globalization, international trade, and international investment practices are 
creating significant pressures towards the development of corporate governance in 
these nations (Reed, 2002).  
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     Secondly, developing and emerging countries have tended to mimic the 
practices of developed nations, despite evidence, for example from Rabelo and 
Vasconncelos (2002), of the presence of differences between the factors giving 
rise to the need for corporate governance in developing nations and those in 
developed nations.  
     Thirdly, there are structural variations, such as the dominance of government 
ownership and/or family /close held companies that render the implementation of 
Western style corporate governance both of questionable value and troublesome 
(Mensah, 2002).  
     Fourthly, developing and emerging nations are not homogeneous. Specifically, 
there are major differences between the emerging countries of Eastern European 
and China, as there are between countries in the Middle East, North Africa and 
sub-Saharan Africa (Euromoney, 2007; Fawzy, 2004). Finally, while there may be 
increasing convergence among national and international corporate governance 
codes, there is also significant deviation in terms of disclosure practices and 
content of disclosure between countries (Bhuiyan and Biswas, 2007).  
     The paper investigates the determinants of corporate governance voluntary 
disclosures in Egypt. It contributes to disclosure and governance literature by 
studying corporate governance disclosure practice in a developing country, which 
is distinguished from most developed nations by four important characteristics 
(Fawzy, 2004). Firstly, most companies are closely held, secondly there is 
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considerable state ownership of privatized companies, thirdly that board 
independence is weak and finally disclosure is not a common practice. While 
Bremer and Ellias (2007) note that Egyptian businesses are starting to appreciate 
the need for corporate governance mechanisms, they argue that together with 
Fawzy’s four characteristics, weakness in the economic structure, and lack of 
awareness of corporate governance concepts and benefits, hinder the development 
of corporate governance in Egypt. Thus the results of this research may be useful 
for regulators in developing and emerging nations with similar characteristics as 
they continue to deliberate appropriate corporate governance requirements in their 
own nations. 
     In an Egyptian context, Samaha and Dahawy (2010, and 2011) found that 
corporate governance mechanisms affect the Egyptian companies’ general print-
based annual reports voluntary disclosures. They found lower directors 
ownership; lower block-holder ownership; higher independent directors and audit 
committee existence are more properly to monitor the manager’s decision to 
report more voluntary information.  Investigating the determinants of corporate 
governance disclosures in the 2005 annual reports of the top thirty Egyptian listed 
companies’ (EGX 30), Samaha (2010) found that board independence is 
positively associated with corporate governance disclosures. This paper extends 
the work done by Samaha (2010) as follows: firstly, it provides a more recent 
investigation (year 2009) to help assess developments in corporate governance 
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disclosure. Secondly, it offers a comparative analysis with two international 
reports on corporate governance disclosure scores conducted by the United Nation 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Thirdly, the sample 
companies involve the EGX 70 constitutes along with the EGX 30 constitutes and 
thus enhancing the generalizability of the empirical results, along with. Finally, 
this paper introduces a more comprehensive set of corporate governance 
mechanisms including board size and duality in positions that -to the best of 
authors’ knowledge- have been not tested before in an Egyptian context in 
relation to corporate governance disclosure.  Our descriptive findings relating to 
the extent of corporate governance disclosure for 2009 are relatively lower than 
those reported by Samaha (2010) for a sample of Egyptian firms in 2005, 
although during this period from 2005 to 2009, many regulation changes have 
taken place in Egypt such as the formation of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory 
Authority (EFSA), and the update of the CG code. All these changes aim to 
enhance CG disclosure and transparency in general; however our paper suggests 
that CG disclosure by listed Egyptian firms is almost negligible.  
     The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview on the 
corporate governance in Egypt. Section 3 reviews prior research and develops the 
research hypotheses. Section 4 explains describes the sample, data and the 
research methods. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. The corporate governance in Egypt 
     Corporate governance has many benefits for developing nations like Egypt. It 
helps developing nations to realize high and sustainable rates of growth, increases 
confidence in the national economy, and deepens capital market and increases its 
ability to mobilize savings. In addition, it results in raising investment rates, 
protecting the rights of the minority shareholders or small investors. Also, it 
encourages growth of private sector by supporting its competitive capabilities, 
helping to secure financing for projects, generating profits, and creating job 
opportunities (Dahawy, 2008).  
     In recognition of the need to enhance the level of confidence of foreign 
portfolio investors in the Egyptian capital market, the ministry of investment 
through the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) (http://www.eiod.org) 
introduced a corporate governance code in 2005 for companies listed in the stock 
market, especially those being actively trading. The Egyptian Corporate 
Governance Code (ECGC) is initially prepared in accordance with the Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Subsequently, a team of 
Egyptian experts drafted the initial code, which was then subjected to in-depth 
examination and extended discussions. At the end, the code was reviewed by 
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experts from the OECD, the IFC (International Finance Corporation) and also the 
World Bank.  
     This code includes many provisions, the objectives of which are to guarantee 
the rights of all shareholders as well as various stakeholders. Enhancing corporate 
disclosure transparency is one of the pillars of corporate governance. The 
introduced ECGC searches for more accuracy of disclosed corporate information 
organizing the relationship between the shareholders, board of directors and 
management. However, compliance with the ECCG code is not mandatory.  
     Actual corporate governance practices of Egyptian listed companies continue 
to lag behind the law on the books, in particular for companies outside the EGX 
30 (World Bank, 2009). For example, a number of boards do not guide or 
supervise management by helping them develop and holding them accountable to 
a set of key performance indicators. Key policies on risk management, internal 
control and audit processes, and succession planning are often absent. Board 
nomination processes largely remain opaque and are frequently dominated by 
majority owners, at times leading to important skills-gaps and insider boards. 
Although financial reporting has improved markedly in terms of the timeliness 
and quality of disclosure; however, non-financial disclosure remains 
underdeveloped. Few companies publicly disclose their ownership and 
governance structures, remuneration policies, or foreseeable risk factors online or 
in their annual reports (World Bank, 2009).  
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     However the corporate governance ROSC (World Bank, 2009) argued that 
Egypt can take a major step forward in closing these gaps by requiring companies 
to implement the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code (ECGC) on a 'comply-or-
explain' basis, and amending the ECGC to better meet good practice and Further 
strengthening enforcement capacity and supporting the EIoD to roll-out its 
director training program, focusing on family-owned businesses outside the EGX 
30.  
3. Economic Incentives and Hypotheses 
     This section reviews the possible incentives for corporate governance 
disclosure and develops the related research hypotheses. Corporate governance 
mechanisms can be considered as key factors explaining the decisions of 
corporate voluntary disclosure from agency theory perspectives. Thus, these 
mechanisms will be examined in this paper. It is also worth noting that very 
limited research has been undertaken to examine the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate governance disclosure. To the 
best of our knowledge, only five published papers examine this research issue 
(two of these articles focus on the developed countries, while three focus on the 
developing countries). For the developed countries, using Canadian firms, Bujaki 
and McConomy (2002) find that firms with more unrelated directors are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose more corporate governance information. For a 
sample of European companies, Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) find that 
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ownership structure affects levels of corporate governance disclosures. In the 
developing countries, Muhamed et al (2009) find that corporate governance 
mechanisms do not affect levels of corporate governance disclosure in Malaysia, 
while Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2010) find that board independence and audit 
committee size are the key incentives for corporate governance disclosures in 
Saudi Arabia. Samaha (2010) find that board independence affect corporate 
governance disclosure for a sample of 30 Egyptian companies. To develop our 
research hypotheses, we review prior research which suggests association 
between voluntary disclosure and some corporate governance mechanisms. We 
formulate hypotheses related to board characteristics, ownership structure and the 
existence of audit committees as follows.  
 
BOARD CHARACTERTICS 
Board Composition 
     Fama (1980) argues that the board of directors, which is elected by the 
shareholders, is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers. 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), and more recently Chau and Leung 
(2006) and Weir and Laing (2003) suggest that boards with a higher proportion of 
outside or independent directors will increase the quality of monitoring over 
management, because “they are not affiliated with the company as officers or 
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employees, and thus are independent representatives of the shareholders’ 
interests” (Pincus et al. 1989: 246). Beasley (1996) found less likelihood of fraud 
in financial statements produced by companies with boards with higher 
proportions of outside directors. 
     The presence of independent directors on boards may improve the quality of 
financial statements. For example, they are associated with less earnings 
management (Peasnell et al., (2000); Chtourou et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2001; and 
Klein, 2002). Such findings may be attributable to the positive association 
between the number of independent directors and firms’ discretionary decisions to 
increase the level of independence on the audit committee above the suggested 
minimum (Williams, 2002). 
     Furthermore, non-executive directors may boost monitoring of the quality of 
financial disclosures, as reported by Chen and Jaggi (2000) in Hong Kong and 
Cheng and Courtenay (2004) in Singapore. That is, they encourage more 
voluntary disclosures (Adams and Hossain, 1998), specifically, as reported by 
Leung and Horwitz (2004), in relation to voluntary segment disclosure. They 
reduce the benefits from withholding information (Forker, 1992) and, as Dechow 
et al. (1996) found, firms with boards dominated by management incur more 
accounting enforcement actions by the SEC. Prior research supports the positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and board independence (i.e. 
Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Adams et al., 1998 and Chen and Jaggi (2000).  On 
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the other hand, other studies some researchers, especially in developing nations, 
do not find a significant relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and 
board independence (Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
and Ho and Wong (2001). This may be due to the ties that some non-executive 
directors have to the company that undermines their independence in some 
countries (Tengamnuay and Stapleton, 2008). Other research supports a substitute 
relationship. Eng and Mak (2003), Barako et al. (2006), and Gul and Leung 
(2004) report a significant negative association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and board independence. Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2010) also find a 
negative association between corporate governance voluntary disclosures and 
board independence in Saudi Arabia.  
     In the Egyptian context, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Samaha and Dahawy 
(2010 and 2011) find that the association between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure in Egypt is positive. Based on these arguments, we set our 
first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1 Companies with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors on 
the board have higher levels of CG disclosures.  
 
Board Size 
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     Board size is the number of executive and non-executive directors on 
company’s board. Agency theory suggests that large boards can play a crucial role 
in monitoring the board and in making strategic decisions. In addition, it suggests 
that large boards are less likely to dominant by the management (Hussainey and 
Wang, 2011). Furthermore, large boards lead to increase the expertise diversity in 
the board including financial reporting expertise (Singh et al, 2004; Yermack, 
1996; Laksamana, 2008). Prior research also find that there is a negative 
association between board size and earnings management, suggesting that large 
board size leads to higher disclosure quality. Therefore, firms with large board 
size are more likely to voluntarily disclose more information in their annual 
reports and websites.   
     On the other hand, Goodstein et al (1994) argue that large board size might 
have a negative effect of the effectiveness of the board. Members of large boards 
are more likely to be less motivated to participate in strategic decision-making 
(i.e. the decision to increase voluntary disclosure). As a result, a negative 
association between board size and disclosure would be expected.  
     Majority of prior studies find a positive association between board size and 
voluntary disclosure (Barako et al, 2006; Laksamana 2008, Hussainey and Al-
Najjar (2011). On the other hand, some studies did not find any association 
between board size and disclosure (Evans, 2004; Willekens et al, 2005; Lakhal, 
2005). 
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     In the Egyptian context, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) find that board size is 
positively associated with levels of corporate voluntary disclosure. Based on these 
arguments, we set our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2 Companies with large board size have a higher level of CG disclosure. 
 
Duality in position 
 
     Role duality in position exists when the CEO (Chief executive officer) is also 
the chairman of the board at the same time. Agency theory predicts that role 
duality creates individual power for CEO that would affect the effective control 
exercised by the board. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
independent directors can play a significant role in monitoring the performance of 
managers and limit their earnings management. In addition, Gul and Leung 
(2004) argue that firms with large number of independent directors are expected 
to be more effective in board monitoring and hence in offering more information 
to the public.  
     Prior research on the association between duality in position and corporate 
voluntary disclosure is mixed. Some studies find a negative association between 
the two variables (Lakhal, 2005; Laksamana, 2008; Forker, 1992, Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004). Other studies did not 
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find any significant association between the two variables (Arcay and Vazquez, 
2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001; Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006). In the Egyptian context, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) find that duality in 
position is negatively associated with levels of corporate voluntary disclosures, 
but the association is not statistically significant at an acceptable level. Based on 
these arguments, we set our third hypothesis as follows: 
H3 Companies with duality in position have a lower level of CG disclosures. 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
     Agency theory suggests that companies will disclose more information where 
there is diffused ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Compared to companies 
with concentrated ownership, there is greater potential for agency conflict with 
diffuse ownership since the divergence of interests between the contracting parties 
is likely to be wider. Disclosure may reduce agency costs since it helps solve the 
monitoring problems experienced by diffuse owners (Schipper, 1981). Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) argue that the structure of ownership determines the level of 
monitoring and thereby the level of disclosure, so that in a widely-held company, 
managers may provide additional information to signal that they are acting in the 
best interests of the principles, whereas highly concentrated ownership may be 
linked to lower levels of disclosure.  
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     The current paper uses three ownership measures: director ownership (the 
proportion of ordinary shares held by the CEO and executive directors), block-
holder ownership (the proportion of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders with shareholdings of 5% or more) and the number of shareholders. 
Director ownership 
     A director who owns a substantial portion of the company’s shares bears the 
consequences and reaps the benefits of managerial actions that destroy and create 
value; thus, agency costs may be reduced by director ownership (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), because it aligns the interests of the agent and shareholder, 
thereby reducing the need for shareholder monitoring and thus disclosure.  
     Low director ownership increases agency problems because managers have 
greater incentives to consume bonuses and lower incentives to maximize job 
performance (Eng & Mak, 2003), so that, shareholders need to counteract the 
increase in agency costs (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). However, as additional 
monitoring increases the costs of the firm managers have an incentive to provide 
voluntary disclosures (Eng & Mak, 2003). That is, disclosure is a substitute for 
monitoring. Furthermore, Kelton and Yang (2008) predict that the need for more 
monitoring and more transparent disclosure decreases with higher percentages of 
director ownership, so that, director ownership is a corporate governance 
mechanism that acts as a substitute for disclosure.   
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     Early empirical evidence supports these arguments in developed nations, for 
example Ruland et al. (1990) show director ownership to be negatively related to 
voluntary disclosure. In developing countries, for example, Eng and Mak (2003) 
find such an association in Singapore listed companies, as do Ghazali & Weetman 
(2006) in Malaysian companies.  
     In an Egyptian context, Samaha and Dahawy (2011) find a negative 
association between the director ownership and the voluntary corporate 
disclosures made by the top 30 Egyptian listed companies. Based on these 
arguments, we set our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4 Companies with low percentages of director ownership have higher levels of 
CG disclosures. 
Block-holder ownership 
     Block-holder is a shareholder with an exceptionally large amount of shares. 
Early research indicated the presence of a negative relation between block-holder 
ownership and disclosure in developed countries such as Australia (McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe, 1993; and Mitchell et al., 1995), Finland (Schadewitz and 
Blevins, 1998), and Germany (Marston and Polei, 2004). Mixed results were 
found in developing countries. In a Malaysian context, for example, Hossain et al 
(1994) find a negative association between voluntary disclosure and block-holder 
ownership, while Haniffa and Cooke, (2002) find a positive association. Marston 
and Polei (2004) argue that investors who own only a small percentage of shares 
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in a company have limited access to information about the company. Therefore, it 
is likely that firms with a more dispersed ownership of shares will disclose more 
information to satisfy investors’ needs. In contrast, investors with large equity 
shares in a company can obtain information about the company from internal 
sources. Therefore, more closely held companies are more likely to disclose less 
information because their large investors can access internal sources of 
information.  
     In an Egyptian context, the findings of Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 2011) 
indicate a negative impact for block-holder ownership on voluntary corporate 
disclosures. Based on these arguments, we set our fifth hypothesis as follows: 
H5 Companies with lower percentages of block-holder ownership have higher 
levels of CG disclosures. 
 
Number of shareholders 
     Based on the agency theory, García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballestabas (2010) 
argue that information asymmetry between companies and their shareholders 
increases when ownership is widely dispersed. Therefore, the existence of a 
higher number of shareholders for a company would increase agency costs. To 
reduce these costs, firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose more information 
in their annual reports and/or websites. Prior research, mostly addressing 
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voluntary disclosures in general, supports the agency theory hypothesis that levels 
of disclosure are positively associated with numbers of shareholders in different 
countries such as Sweden (Cooke, 1989); USA (Malone et al., 1993), Japan, 
(Cooke, 1991) and Hong Kong and Singapore (Chau and Gray, 2002). In an 
Egyptian context, Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 2011) did not find any 
evidence for an association between number of shareholders and the corporate 
voluntary disclosure level. Based on these arguments, we set our sixth hypothesis 
as follows: 
H6 Companies with greater numbers of shareholders have higher levels of 
corporate governance (CG) disclosures. 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
     Historically audit committees were a monitoring mechanism formed 
voluntarily in high agency cost situations to improve the quality of information 
flow between principal and agents (Bradbury, 1990). The 1980s and 1990s saw 
substantial growth in the numbers of audit committees often as a response to 
financial scandal, and they have received increased awareness in recent years 
(Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). Agency theory predicts that audit committees 
should lower agency costs especially if, following best international practice, they 
consist mainly of non-executive directors. Audit committees may be an important 
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part of the decision control system used by the board of directors to monitor 
internal control (Fama, 1980), and predicted benefits include ensuring the quality 
of financial accounting and control systems (Collier, 1993).  
     Empirical evidence suggests that audit committees play a complementary role 
to information disclosure (Forker, 1992; Barako et al., 2006). The Egyptian 
context empirical results are mixed; Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 2011) found 
an audit committee existence complementary effect on the general corporate 
voluntary disclosures; however Samaha (2010) did not find a significant 
association with the Egyptian corporate governance disclosures. Based on these 
arguments, we set our seventh hypothesis as follows: 
H7 Companies with audit committees have a higher level of CG disclosure 
 
4.  Research Method 
Sample and data 
     The study examines annual reports and websites of the most active 100 
Egyptian companies on the Egyptian Stock Exchange as measured by the EGX 
100 index at the financial year ends on 2009. The CG disclosure data were 
measured using a content analysis technique. Data on explanatory variables were 
found either on the annual reports or on the companies’ websites. We limit our 
analysis to 100 companies due to the fact that measuring corporate disclosure 
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levels by the traditional content analysis requires a considerable time and effort. 
The sample included the hard copy annual reports for 2009, as well as current CG 
disclosures on the companies’ websites.  As a starting point we examined official 
company websites in order to get information concerning the annual reports for 
2009, internet reporting and any CG stand-alone reports for 2009. Annual reports 
and corporate governance data are purchased from the Egyptian Company for 
Information Dissemination (EGID) in case the company did not have a website or 
did not provide its annual report on the website. Firm characteristics data such as 
leverage, firm size, profitability and industry types are collected from firms’ 
annual reports or websites.
1
  
     The study uses a corporate governance checklist developed by the 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) that is organized by UNCTAD. The checklist 
follows ISAR’s good guidance practice (ISAR, 2006), which has become its 
benchmark for conducting the content analysis for the annual reports and websites 
to identify corporate governance disclosure score for our sample.   
     Table 1 presents the definition of our dependent variable and the definitions 
and the source of information for each independent variable.   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Model specification and variable measurement 
     To test for an association between CG disclosure levels and CG attributes in 
Egypt, one overall (EXTCGDIS) and five sub-indices, corresponding to the five 
UNCTAD categories, have been calculated. The dependent variables are listed 
and defined in Table 6 Panel A. The scores for the overall and sub-indices are 
calculated by assigning equal weightings to each item of disclosure, and the 
indices were derived by computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the 
maximum possible score attainable for items that were applicable to each 
company. 
     Each item of disclosure was scored without a weighting on a dichotomous 
basis taking the commonly used approach of giving the item a score of 1, 0, or not 
applicable N/A (see for example, Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Chau and Gray, 
2002; Cooke, 1989, 1991; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; and Ho and Wong, 2001). 
To ensure that companies were not penalized for non-disclosure of irrelevant 
items each annual report (hard copy or on the companies’ websites) was read in 
its entirety, following Cooke (1989, 1991). Furthermore, all annual reports (hard 
copy or on the companies’ websites) were read twice to ensure consistency in 
scoring. The second examination was done after analyzing all annual reports in 
the first round to ensure consistency in scoring. In the few cases where differences 
existed between the first and second scoring, the annual reports (hard copy or on 
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the companies’ websites) were subjected to a third final assessment. We use the 
following OLS transformed multiple regression model
2
: 
EXTCGDIS   = 0 + 1 BCOM +2 BSIZE + 3 DUAL + 4 DIR + 5 BLK + 
6 NS + 7 ACO + 8 LVG + 9 LGSIZE + 10 PRO + 11 INDT + e 
     We also use the following regression models to examine the association 
between corporate governance voluntary disclosure sub-categories and corporate 
governance mechanisms. We use the transformed OLS multiple regression for the 
following subcategories of corporate governance disclosure (OSE; FT and BM): 
 
OSE = 0 + 1 BCOM +2 BOSIZE + 3 DUALT + 4 DIR + 5 BLK + 6 NS 
+ 7 ACO + 8 LVG + 9 LGSIZE + 10 PRO + 11 INDT + e 
 
FT =0 + 1 BCOM +2 BOSIZE + 3 DUALT + 4 DIR + 5 BLK + 6 NS + 
7 ACO + 8 LVG + 9 LGSIZE + 10 PRO + 11 INDT + e 
 
BM = 0 + 1 BCOM +2 BOSIZE + 3 DUALT + 4 DIR + 5 BLK + 6 NS 
+ 7 ACO + 8 LVG + 9 LGSIZE + 10 PRO + 11 INDT + e 
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     We also use a binary logistic regression model for the CR subcategory of 
corporate governance disclosure. We use the following model: 
CR = 0 + 1 BCOM +2 BOSIZE + 3 DUALT + 4 DIR + 5 BLK + 6 NS 
+ 7 ACO + 8 LVG + 9 LGSIZE + 10 PRO + 11 INDT + e 
     For the Audit subcategory of corporate governance voluntary disclosure, we 
could not run the model as this subcategory was scored zero by more than 95% of 
the sample companies and hence there were not enough variations among the 
sample companies. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Descriptive analysis 
     The ISAR checklist examines a total of 53 corporate governance disclosure 
items, which are normally divided into five categories. For each of these five 
categories, Table 2 presents, in the first column, the corporate governance 
disclosures achieved by the top 100 Egyptian companies, together with 
comparison figures that show that these disclosure levels are typically lower than 
those reported by UNCTAD (2006) in its annual international review. The second 
column of the table shows the disclosures made by 105 enterprises drawn from 
both high and low/middle income countries and the third columns show a 
comparison with 63 enterprises drawn from low/ middle income countries only. 
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     Panel 1 shows that in line with international experience all 100 companies 
disclose the company objectives, and financial and operating results, and that at 
least two thirds make disclosures about accounting estimates and related party 
transactions. These three financial transparency items are required by Egyptian 
Accounting Standards (EASs).  Panel 2 shows that the degree of disclosure 
relating to OSE is low by international standards, with even the best items 
attracting only a 37% implementation rate. As Panel 3 shows, by far the most 
frequent disclosures relating to BM in Egypt are “risk management objectives, 
system and activities”. Again this is an area of mandatory reporting under EASs.  
     In line with international experience CR and auditing related disclosures are 
the lowest. Nevertheless, as shown in Panel 4 just short of 10% of Egyptian 
companies do make some environmental and social responsibility disclosures. 
Least disclosure was evident in the auditing category in Egypt, as Panel 5 shows, 
and in this context it is worth noting that Egypt does not have rules similar to 
those in the US Sarbanes Oxley Act which prohibit accounting/auditing firms 
from simultaneously providing both auditing and consulting services to the same 
client. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
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     The descriptive statistics for the independent variables are shown in Table 3. 
The average firm size in terms of total assets is 3.7 billion Egyptian pounds 
(approximately 462 million Euros). The debt: equity (leverage) ratio is on average 
57% and there are an average of 17 shareholders, implying that the ownership 
structure is quite highly geared and highly concentrated in these companies, 
although there are quite wide distributions in the values of the total assets and the 
number of shareholders. On average profitability (PRO) indicates that majority of 
firms are profitable. The mean percentage of independent directors on the board is 
56%. Average board size is 11 members. Mean director ownership is 9%.  Twenty 
two percent of the chosen sample has an audit committee; 61% of company’s 
CEO serves as a board chairman and 55% of our chosen firms are related to 
manufacturing industry.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
     Table 4 shows the distribution of the dependent variable. Panel 1 shows that 
while there are large variations among the sample companies, these indices and 
their ranges suggest that the overall disclosure level is relatively low, implying 
that, consistent with Ho and Wong (2001) in Hong Kong, analysts in Egypt may 
need to search for information outside of the published annual reports. Panel 2 
shows the distribution of five sub-indices of information. On average, as in other 
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countries the Egyptian companies perform best on FT, where they provide 50.4% 
of the items. It is worth noting that Egyptian Accounting Standards require 
disclosure of five of the nine items in this sub-index and disclosure is checked by 
the newly formed Egyptian Financial Supervisory Board (EFSA) 
(http://www.efsa.gov.eg/). Failure to disclose results in a warning letter and 
ultimately could lead to delisting. Disclosure of items in the other four sub-
indices, which are generally not required by EASs or followed by the EFSA, are, 
on average, all below 40%.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Correlation analysis 
     Table 5 presents the correlation analysis between the overall corporate 
governance voluntary disclosure and independent variables. It shows that firms 
with higher number of shares; large number of independent directors on boards 
and firms with large size are more likely to provide higher levels of corporate 
governance voluntary disclosures. It shows that EXTCGDIS is positively 
correlated with NS (r =.482), BCOM (r =.496) and LGSIZE (r =.547) and these 
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. The table also shows that 
firms with large block holder ownership and role duality are more likely to 
provide less corporate governance voluntary disclosures. It shows that 
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EXTCGDIS is negatively correlated with block-holder ownership (BLK) (r =-
.577) role duality (DUALT) (r=-.620) and these correlations are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus the univariate analysis supports H6 and H1 that 
the number of shareholders and proportion of independent directors are positively 
correlated with the level of corporate governance disclosure. H5 and H3 are also 
supported because block-holder ownership and role duality dual is negatively 
correlated with the level of disclosure. However, neither the correlation between 
DIR and EXTCGDIS nor BOSIZE and EXTCGDIS is significant, so that 
hypotheses H2 and H4 are not supported.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
  
Regression results 
     Regression results are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the cross-
sectional OLS regressions for the aggregated score of corporate governance 
voluntary disclosures score and three sub-categories (OSE; FT and BM), Table 7 
shows the cross-sectional binary logistic regressions for CR subcategory. 
     For the board composition, we find that the coefficient estimate on BCOM is 
positive and statistically significant with EXTCGDIS at the 1% level. This 
supports hypothesis H1 that companies with a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board disclose more CG information in their annual reports. 
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Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on the proportion of independent directors 
on the board are positive and significant at the 5% level in explaining two types of 
CG disclosure (OSE and FT).  This finding is consistent with the Egyptian studies 
of Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 2011) and Samaha (2010). 
     We find that the coefficient estimates on board size are mixed (positive and 
negative) and is not statistically significant in any of the corporate governance 
disclosure models. Therefore we reject H2. These findings are in line with prior 
research (i.e. Evans, 2004; Willekens et al, 2005; Lakhal, 2005). 
     We find that the coefficient estimates on role duality are negative and 
statistically significant for EXTCGDIS, OSE and BM. The negative sign on role 
duality is consistent with prior research (i.e. Lakhal, 2005; Laksamana, 2008; 
Forker, 1992, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 
2004, Ezat and El-Masry). Therefore we partially accept H3.  
     Furthermore, director ownership is negatively associated with only one 
category of CG disclosure (CR), so that hypothesis H4 that CG disclosure 
increases with decreases in director ownership is not generally supported.   
     As we find significant negative association between BLK and EXTCGDIS, 
OSE, BM and CR, hypothesis H5 is partially accepted. This finding for Egyptian-
listed companies is line with Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 2011) and consistent 
with prior research in developed (i.e. Martson and Polei, 2004) and developing 
(i.e. Hossain et al, 1994) countries who also found that the level of voluntary 
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disclosure is significantly related with block-holder ownership. Our sixth 
hypothesis predicts that ownership structure is associated with overall CG 
disclosure, as well as the various subcategories of information. With respect to the 
number of shareholders we do not find any significant association between NS 
and EXTCGDIS, OSE, FT, BM or CR, which indicates that ownership structure is 
not influencing of CG disclosures in Egypt. Thus, hypothesis H6 is rejected. Our 
results are consistent with Ghazali and Weetman (2006) found ownership 
structure is not statistically significant in explaining voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia. 
     Our findings in relation to the existence of an audit committee (ACO) suggest 
that in order to understand the drivers of CG disclosure research should 
disaggregate the dimensions of CG. ACO is neither significant in explaining 
overall CG disclosure nor three of the four partial categories of CG disclosure 
indicating a lack of support for hypothesis H7. We only find a significant positive 
association between ACO and the CR model (p<.065). This is a predicted 
direction which is consistent with Ho and Wong (2001) and Barako et al. (2006) 
who found the existence of audit committees to be positively significant. This 
may suggest that audit committees in Egypt play a complementary monitoring 
role to CR CG disclosure. This finding is line with Samaha and Dahawy (2010 
and 2011) in regards to the print-based (hard copy) annual reports voluntary 
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disclosures, however inconsistent with Samaha’s (2010) corporate governance 
disclosures analysis.  
     In relation to our control variables, we find that leverage is not statistically 
significant in any of the corporate governance disclosure models. This implies 
that the level of corporate governance disclosure is not influenced by the agency 
costs of debt in Egypt. We also find a positive association between firm size and 
EXTCGDIS, FT and BM at the 1% level. It is usually expected that larger firms 
arrange for voluntary disclosure more often than smaller ones. This seems 
reasonable because of financial facilities and benefiting from stronger information 
systems. Profitability and industry type are only significant in explaining one type 
of CG information (CR). The coefficient estimates on both variables are positive 
and significant at the 10% level.   
 
6. Conclusions 
     The association between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
disclosure has been examined over the last few years. However, limited studies 
examine the extent to which corporate governance mechanisms affect firms’ 
decisions to voluntarily report corporate governance information in their annual 
reports. This paper extends and contributes to recent governance and disclosure 
literature (i.e. Samaha, 2010) by offering empirical evidence on the impact of a 
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comprehensive set of corporate governance variables on corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure for a large sample of most and less actively traded companies 
in Egypt, as an example of an emerging economy. 
     In terms of overall disclosure practice, we find that there are generally low 
levels of disclosure, except for the items which represent mandatory disclosure as 
required by Egyptian Accounting Standards. It is interesting to note that in total 
41 of the 53 items in the checklist are mandatory because of EGX listing 
requirements (UNCTAD, 2007), but that levels of disclosure are low on many of 
the items which EGX requires but EAS does not. This does suggest that 
enforcement of EGX rules requires tightening. Our descriptive findings on the 
extent of CG disclosure relating to the year 2009 are relatively similar to Samaha 
(2010) for a sample of listed Egyptian companies in 2005. The failure of 
companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and 
inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. Moreover, the phenomenon of 
non-compliance may also be attributed to the socio-economic factors in Egypt. 
Given the present unbalanced political situation, prevalent corruption, 
deteriorating law and order situation and the influence of the social elite, non-
compliance to the legal requirements often go unpunished encouraging more 
noncompliance. Furthermore, this may imply that the learning curve is very slow 
in developing countries compared to developed countries. In the absence of 
independent verification, the credibility of CG information disclosed is 
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questionable. To sum up, the reasons for this phenomenon may be attributed to 
the lack of statutory CG disclosure requirements, less CG awareness, an under-
developed corporate culture and the relatively new stock market which was 
activated in the mid 1990’s. In light of the above, it is expected that firms will 
take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. 
     Regarding the determinants of corporate governance disclosures, we find that – 
ceteris paribus – the extent of CG disclosure of Egyptian-listed companies: (1) is 
lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration 
as measured by block-holder ownership; and (2) increases with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and the firm size. By disaggregating total CG 
disclosure into the 4 UNCTAD components, we are able to also specify the 
components of CG impacted by various determinants.  
     This paper is also subject to a number of limitations. First, we are mainly 
testing hypotheses on the potential incentives of disclosure on corporate 
governance that are particularly well grounded in uses of governance in 
developed countries, but less so in developing environments. In particular, our 
hypotheses are mainly relating to agency and information asymmetry problems 
stemming from the relationship between the firm and its external financiers 
(shareholders or debtholders). A worthwhile avenue for future research could be 
to test additional hypotheses of the demand for corporate governance disclosure 
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originating from other stakeholders than just shareholders or debtholders. Second, 
our analysis is limited to a sample of Egyptian companies. However, we believe 
that the same hypotheses are worth testing outside Egypt, and that it is reasonable 
to expect a higher level of corporate governance disclosure in other countries with 
better investor protection and with more developed capital markets. 
     Despite the limitations, the results of the study support theoretical arguments 
that companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs stemming from the separation between 
ownership and control, and to improve investor confidence in the reported 
accounting information.  
     It is interesting to consider the costs and benefits of the reform processes that 
Egypt and other countries are implementing. While the ECGC recommends that 
actively traded companies should have an audit committee and exploit the 
knowledge of independent board members, the findings of this study indicate that 
only three of these new provisions to enhance corporate governance (block-holder 
ownership; independent directors; role duality) are statistically significant in 
explaining CG disclosure in Egyptian annual reports. However, this study shows 
that audit committees’ role in Egypt does not comply with the fundamentals of 
agency theory and that this CG supervisory tool has little role in improved 
financial disclosure. That is the benefit of audit committees is unclear. This would 
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be an interesting idea for further research. In addition, it would be interesting to 
examine the stock market reaction to the aggregated and different types of 
corporate governance disclosures.  
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NOTES 
     
1
 The extant literature identifies several company-specific characteristics as relevant to the 
voluntary disclosure of financial information. Some variables such as company size are generally 
found to be significant in prior literature, perhaps because they are politically visible, more 
exposed to greater regulation, such as price controls, and possibly the threat of nationalization. 
Therefore, they disclose more information (Eng and Mak, 2003). With respect to other variables, 
the results are inconsistent across studies, often depending on country and exchange studied. Thus 
the choice of control variables in the multiple regression models for testing the main hypotheses, 
shown in Table 1 Panel C, follows the practice in prior research (see for example: Raffournier, 
1995; Meek et al., 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006 
and Aly et al, 2010). 
     
2
 A multicollinearity test was performed using Pearson’s product moment correlations. Our 
analysis shows that there is no multicollinearity problem between the independent variables.  
Regression diagnostics were also performed to determine if the assumptions of normality and 
equal variances were met for all dependent variables. Diagnostics included Q-Q normality plots, 
examination of histograms of all dependent variables, scatter plots of residuals against the 
predicted values, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-test with Lilliefors correction for each 
independent and dependent variable. This test for each independent and dependent variable 
indicated that some of the corporate governance independent variables are not normally 
distributed. Thus, following Cooke (1998), the continuous independent and dependent variables 
were transformed into ranks based on normal scores before running the regression analysis.
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Table 1 
Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
Abbreviated 
variable name 
Full variable name Variable description Predicted 
sign 
Data source 
Dependent variables 
EXTCGDIS     Overall CG disclosure index Percent of overall applicable CG disclosure items supplied/satisfied  Annual reports 
OSE Ownership Structure and Exercise of 
Control Rights disclosure sub index 
Percent of applicable disclosure index items supplied/satisfied for 
the OSE sub index 
 Annual reports 
FT Financial Transparency and Information 
disclosure sub index 
Percent of applicable disclosure index items supplied/satisfied for 
the FT sub index 
 Annual reports 
AUD Auditing disclosure sub index Percent of applicable disclosure index items supplied/satisfied for 
the AUD sub index 
 Annual reports 
CR Corporate Responsibility and compliance 
disclosure sub index 
Percent of applicable disclosure index items supplied/satisfied for 
the CR sub index 
 Annual reports 
BM Board and Management Structure and 
Process disclosure sub index 
Percent of applicable disclosure index items supplied/satisfied for 
the BM sub index 
 Annual reports 
Independent Variables 
BCOM Board Composition Ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number 
of the directors 
+ Ownership structure information 
(EGID),  Board of directors’ report 
(EGID) 
BOSIZE Board Size The number of board members + Ownership structure information 
(EGID), Board of directors’ report 
(EGID) 
DUALT Duality in position Dummy variable; = 1 when the company’s CEO servers as a board 
chairman, = 0 otherwise 
- Ownership structure information 
(EGID), Board of directors’ report 
(EGID) 
DIR Director ownership  Percentage of shares owned by the CEO and executive directors to 
the total number of shares issued. 
- Ownership structure information 
(EGID) 
BLK Block-holder ownership Percentage of shares owned by the block-holders–shareholders 
whose ownership equal to or exceeds 5% to the total number of 
shares issued. 
- Ownership structure information 
(EGID) 
NS Number of shareholders Number of the owners holding the total number of shares issued. + Ownership structure information 
(EGID) 
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ACO Existence of Audit Committees  Dummy variable; = 1 if the company has an audit committee, = 0 
otherwise 
+ Board of directors’ report (EGID) 
Control Variables 
LEV Leverage  Long-term debt / total assets + Annual report: Financial statements 
LGSIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets  + Annual report: Financial statements 
PRO Profitability  Net income before tax / total stockholders ‘equity. + Annual report: Financial statements 
INDT Industry type  Dummy variable; = 1 if the company is manufacturing, = 0 
otherwise 
+ EGX Bulletin (December 2009) 
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Table 2 
Corporate Governance disclosure index (Egypt compared with 2 UNCTAD reports) 
 CG Disclosures 
 
Current Study 
(Egypt % n=100) 
UNCTAD  
(All % n=105) 
UNCTAD  
(L/M Income  n=63) 
Panel 1: Financial Transparency [sub index FT]    
Financial and operating results *                                                                        100 100 100 
Company objectives *                                                                                       100 92 90 
Critical accounting estimates *                                                                           99 90 84 
Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions *                                 76 94 90 
Disclosure practices on related party transactions where control exists*          73 47 43 
Board’s responsibilities regarding financial communications 4 80 73 
The decision making process for approving transactions with related parties 1 53 54 
Impact of alternative accounting decisions 1 75 68 
Rules and procedure governing extraordinary transactions 0 59 57 
* Mandatory requirements under EAS    
 Panel 2: Ownership structure and exercise of control rights [Sub index OSE]    
Ownership structure  37 90 89 
Control rights   37 82 76 
Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda  37 78 65 
Changes in shareholdings  37 69 65 
Process for holding annual general meetings  19 91 87 
Control and corresponding equity stake  9 75 67 
Control structure  4 86 86 
Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in capital markets. 2 30 25 
Anti-Takeover measures 0 30 22 
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Panel 3: Board and management structure and process [Sub Index BM]  
 
   
Risk management objectives, system and activities *                                               85 89 83 
Composition of board of directors (executives and non-executives)  20 99 98 
Independence of the board of directors  16 68 54 
Number of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors 9 79 71 
Types and duties of outside board and management positions 8 74 62 
Existence of plan of succession  8 52 46 
Qualifications and biographical information on board members  7 83 81 
Determination and composition of directors‘ remuneration  6 68 54 
“Checks and balances” mechanisms 5 88 84 
Governance structures, such as committees and other mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 5 88 81 
Composition and function of governance committee structures 4 86 83 
Role and functions of the board of directors  4 84 78 
Professional development and training activities 4 36 27 
Duration of director’s contracts 3 76 62 
Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm as a result of a merger or acquisition 1 38 27 
Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest among board members 1 67 57 
Performance evaluation process 1 67 57 
Material interests of members of the board and management  1 57 52 
Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period 0 41 33 
* Mandatory requirements under EAS    
Panel 4: Corporate responsibility and compliance [Sub Index CR]    
Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility  10 91 87 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the firm’s sustainability  7 78 71 
Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in business  2 57 48 
A Code of Ethics for the Board and waivers to the ethics code 1 73 63 
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A Code of Ethics for all company employees 1 72 65 
The role of employees in corporate governance  1 25 17 
Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 0 50 35 
Panel 5: Auditing [Sub Index AUD]    
Board confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors  2 58 41 
Process for interaction with external auditors 1 70 57 
Process for appointment of internal auditors /  Scope of work and responsibilities  1 84 76 
Internal control systems  1 75 67 
Duration of current auditors 1 32 17 
Rotation of audit partners 1 21 13 
Process for interaction with internal auditors  1 74 60 
Process for appointment of external auditors  0 81 75 
Auditors‘ involvement in non-audit work and the fees paid to the auditors 0 56 41 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics on the Independent Variables 
 
Variable 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Board Composition 100 .00 .96 .5594 .35537 
Board Size 100 .00 30.00 10.4200 5.77382 
Duality in position 100 .00 1.00 .6100 .49021 
Director ownership  100` .00 .97 .0896 .21860 
Block-holder ownership 100 .00 1.00 .5710 .34468 
Number of shareholders 
100 3.00 95.00 16.8400 14.52043 
Existence of Audit Committees  100 .00 1.00 .2200 .41633 
Leverage  100 .00 7.66 .5708 1.26746 
Firm size* 100 157 38,000 3700 6.95799E9 
Profitability  100 -1.34 1.18 .2082 .27757 
Industry type  100 .00 1.00 .5500 .50000 
                           Notes: * In million EGP 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics on the Dependent Variables 
 
 
Variable 
Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Panel 1: Overall corporate governance score for EGX 100 companies 
 
Overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index .60 .06 .66 .16 .10094 
 
Panel 2: Corporate Governance disclosure sub-indices 
 
Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure Sub-Index (FT) .56 .33 .89 .50 .10567 
Ownership Structure and Exercise of Control Rights Sub-Index 
(OSE) 
.78 .00 .78 .20 .25831 
Board and Management Structure and Process Sub-Index (BM) .74 .00 .74 .10 .14106 
Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Sub-Index (CR) .57 .00 .57 .03 .10269 
Auditing Sub-Index (AUD) .33 .00 .33 .01 .04639 
 
 
 
 
        
        
        
 Corporate Governance Disclosure And Its Determinants In Egypt 
 57 
 
 
Table 5 
Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent and independent variables (N =100) 
 
 
EXTCGDIS NS BLK DIR BCOM BOSIZE DUALT ACO LEV LGSIZE PRO INDT 
EXTCGDIS 1            
NS .482
**
 1           
BLK -.577
**
 -.470
**
 1          
DIR .025 -.049 .149 1         
BCOM .496
**
 .214
*
 -.303
**
 -.091 1        
BOSIZE -.035 .120 .046 .056 -.003 1       
DUALT -.620
**
 -.269
**
 .569
**
 .081 -.422
**
 .098 1      
ACO .185 .053 -.209
*
 .006 .295
**
 .033 -.219
*
 1     
LEV .046 -.008 -.069 .069 .048 -.064 -.060 .091 1    
LGSIZE .547
**
 .341
**
 -.280
**
 -.059 .253
*
 .066 -.214
*
 .071 .132 1   
PRO .140 .079 -.016 -.038 .022 .039 .038 .021 -.267
**
 .080 1  
INDT -.100 -.049 .001 .071 -.102 .063 .060 -.102 -.107 -.289
**
 .031 1 
 
             *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results of the Corporate Governance Disclosure Scores on Test and Control 
Variables (N=100) 
Dependent variable Overall Corporate governance 
disclosure index 
Ownership structure and exercise of 
control rights [Sub index OSE] 
Financial Transparency [sub index 
FT] 
Board and management structure 
and process [Sub Index BM]  
Adjusted R-square 61.8% 51.6% 15.4% 45.6% 
F-value 15.56 10.59 2.64 8.56 
P-value .000*** .000*** .006*** .000*** 
Durbin Watson Test 1.756 1.873 1.766 1.876 
Parameter Coeff. 
Est. 
T-
statistic 
P- value Coeff. Est. T-statistic P- value Coeff. 
Est. 
T-
statistic 
P- value Coeff. Est. T-
statistic 
P- value 
Intercept 
Included Included Included Included 
H1 - BCOM  
.228 3.065 .003*** .186 2.217 .029** .261 2.359 .021** .140 1.577 .118 
H2 - BOSIZE 
-.031 -.479 .633 -.049 -.684 .496 .024 .252 .801 -.022 -.284 .777 
H3 - DUALT  
-.341 -4.430 .000*** -.495 -5.709 .000*** -.092 -.801 .425 -.177 -1.932 .057* 
H4 - DIR 
.024 .370 .712 -.013 -.178 .859 .128 1.320 .190 -.003 -.034 .973 
H5- BLK 
-.230 -2.686 .009*** -.202 -2.095 .039** -.003 -.024 .981 -.205 -2.003 .048** 
H6 - NS  
.010 .122 .903 -.065 -.723 .472 .001 .007 .995 .053 .551 .583 
H7 - ACO 
-.025 -.370 .712 .079 1.042 .300 -.132 -1.325 .189 -.112 -1.397 .166 
LEV– Control 
.034 .502 .617 -.028 -.372 .711 .077 .764 .447 .011 .139 .890 
LGSIZE– Control 
.347 4.787 .000*** .113 1.391 .168 .288 2.673 .009*** .419 4.847 .000*** 
PRO– Control 
.050 .782 .436 -.013 -.181 .857 -.151 -1.569 .120 .075 .973 .333 
INDT– Control 
.047 .698 .487 .090 1.203 .232 .129 1.293 .199 -.080 -1.002 .319 
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*significant at the 10% level      **significant at the 5% level              ***significant at the 1% 
 
Table 7 
Binary Logistic Regression Results of the Corporate Governance Disclosure Scores on Test and Control Variables (N=100) 
 
 Corporate responsibility and compliance [Sub Index CR] 
Pseudo R-square  63% 
Model Chi-square 35.80 
Significance (P-Value) .000*** 
Percentage correctly classified 96 
Parameter Estimate Wald test value Sig. (P- value) 
Intercept 
Included 
H1 - BCOM  
3.622 .835 .361 
H2 - BOSIZE 
.000 .000 .999 
H3 - DUALT  
-.182 .011 .916 
H4 - DIR 
-4.061 .868 .352 
H5- BLK 
-4.910 2.615 .098* 
H6 - NS  
.023 .571 .450 
H7 - ACO 
2.133 3.410 .065* 
LEV– Control 
-.113 .055 .815 
LGSIZE– Control 
.000 .684 .408 
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PRO– Control 
3.666 3.034 .082 
INDT– Control 
2.617 3.197 .074* 
*significant at the 10% level   **significant at the 5% level                        
